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The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has
for an early stage of it, a vague potentiality… 
It must be by a contraction of the vagueness of
that potentiality of everything in general, 
but of nothing in particular, that the world of




1 At the beginning of his studies in aesthetics, Eco found in Dewey’s Art as Experience and
in Luigi Pareyson’s aesthetics an approach to think about art and artwork in a non-
idealistic  way.1 According  to  Eco  “Croce’s  idealistic  philosophy  defined  art  as  the
intuition of a feeling, thereby clearly implying that it had nothing to do with either
morality  or  knowledge”  (Eco  1989:  158),  whereas  Pareyson  put  at  the  core  of  his
investigations  the  specificity  of  the  person,  the  interpretative  perspective  and  the
active force of forms. I will deal with the concepts of formativity and interpretation as
they are formulated by Pareyson in Estetica: Teoria della Formatività shortly (see section
3);  here  lies  indeed  the  proximity  and  the  distance  between  Eco’s  and  Pareyson’s
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perspectives. Presently, though, I would like to consider the central intentions of Eco’s
Opera Aperta.
2 The  subtitle  of  this  book,  Form  and  Indeterminacy  in  Contemporary  Poetics,  which  is
missing in the English version, exemplifies Eco’s intentions and purposes. As stated by
David Robert in the introduction to the English edition of the book, “Opera Aperta is a
polemic  book,  in  marked  conflict  with  the  Crocean  aesthetics  that  dominated  the
Italian academic world in the early sixties” and “Opera Aperta arose partly out of Eco’s
work on general questions of aesthetics, which was strongly influenced by the anti-
Crocean, though still idealist, philosophy of his mentor at the University of Turin, Luigi
Pareyson” (Eco 1989: viii-ix). Although this book has a declared enemy – the aesthetics
of  Benedetto  Croce  –  it  must  be  said  that  Opera  Aperta explains  and  justifies  the
apparently radical differences between modern and traditional art. The term opera –
the work of art – is defined by Eco as “an object endowed with structural properties
that  render  possible  a  number  of  successive  interpretations,  a  series  of  evolving
perspectives, but that also enable us to coordinate such a series” (De Mallac 1971: 32).
3 Opera  Aperta  aims  to  identify  those  works  of  art  that  make  openness  their  formal
characteristic par excellence. As we shall see in this essay, from the concept of openness,
which goes hand in hand with that of vagueness, it does not follow that these forms of
contemporary art abandon the formal aspect in favor of amorphous indeterminacy;
what Eco calls open work does not deny the formal aspect as such but reformulates and
redefines it in a dynamic way. In this text Eco undertakes to write a sort of geometry of
open works of art: he dwells on different forms of art, from the music of Karlheinz
Stockhausen and Luciano Berio, to reflections on comedians, on poets and novelists like
Stéphane  Mallarmé,  James  Joyce  and  Dante,  passing  through a  detailed  analysis  of
cinema and its practices, from the camera as an interpretative perspective to the study
of visual works of art.
If we were to synthesize the object of this research, we could refer to a notion now
acquired  by  many  contemporary  aesthetics:  the  work  of  art  is  a  message
fundamentally ambiguous, a plurality of meanings living together in one signifier.
(Eco 1962: 16; my translation)
4 Needless to say, the concept of open work will be the fil rouge in this paper, albeit in the
fifth  section  it  seemed  useful  to  consider  other  writings  by  Eco  as  well,  since  the
concepts  of  openness  and  vagueness  run  like  a  subterranean  river  in  his  thought,
especially with reference to the open form of narrative and poetic texts. Thus, we will
not deal with all forms of contemporary poetics but only with the narrative one. 
5 This paper neither gives a complete interpretation of Eco’s semiotics, nor tries to write
a  sort  of  historical  genealogy  of  his  thought,  encompassing  Peirce,  Dewey  and
Pareyson. Mainly,  it  takes certain features of  his  thought as  points of  departure in
order to reconstruct them in terms of a pragmatist aesthetics, accepting not only the
existence but  also  the value of  indeterminacy and vagueness.  In  the course  of  this
paper, I would like to give three main explanations for the reason why the aesthetics of
the open work is an example of pragmatist aesthetics. Firstly, according to Eco, art is
neither “an ethereal thing” nor something purely spiritual but, rather, an embodied
way to express, articulate and fulfill our interaction with natural and cultural contexts.
Secondly, Eco has a democratic vision of art: this aspect of the aesthetics of the open
work can be found in the rehabilitation of popular forms of art, in sharp contrast both
with Croce’s idealistic theory of art and with Pareyson’s theory of formativity. Thirdly,
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art is not pursued for its own sake, since artworks can open up new possibilities in our
everyday life by constantly transforming our habits and our practices upon which we
base our daily relation with the world.
 
1. On a Certain Latitude of Interpretation. Peirce’s
Semiotic of Vagueness
In this section I will focus on Peirce’s notion of vagueness. The concept of vagueness is
extremely  important  within  Peirce’s  philosophical  system because  it  does  not  only
concern the logical-communicative aspect of signs, but it is also what allows him to
support his theory of fallibilism, synechism and realism,2 arguing that reality itself is
something  general  and  vague.  As  a  result,  vagueness  does  not  only  have  a  mere
semiotic  value,  but  also  an ontic  one.  It  is  an irreducible  constituent  of  reality,  “a
universal real principle, and not a deficiency of our knowledge” (CP.4.344) because, for
instance, vagueness surrounds our acritical forms of certainty like habits, indubitable
beliefs and common-sense practices.
6 Within the pragmatist movement, Peirce is not the only one to discuss the importance
of  vagueness:  William  James,  in  his  Principles  of  Psychology  (1890), focuses  on  this
concept as far as it concerns a fruitful discovery for both psychology and philosophy. In
the chapter entitled “The Stream of Thought,” James describes our mental life as a
continuous stream and develops a conception of vagueness by understanding it as an
inarticulate background from which knowledge must start. According to James, the aim
is not to minimize these vague elements of our knowledge so as to achieve absolute
precision and accuracy, but to argue in favor of this vague and inarticulate dimension
of experience so as to avoid the static subject-object dichotomy, understanding that
vagueness is an unavoidable dimension of experience. Obviously, it will not be possible
to give either a full account of this concept or a very detailed explanation; thus, I will
set aside these important issues, giving only a sketch to understand the importance of
vagueness in relation to the Echian concept of openness. 
7 In 1905 Peirce wrote: “I have worked out the logic of vagueness with something like
completeness” (5.506). Both Claudine Tiercelin (1992: 66) and Jarret E. Brock (1969: 3)
state that the logic of  vagueness is  not something new to be discovered in Peirce’s
published  and  unpublished  writings,  but  that  it  deals  with  the  tripartition  in
Stechiology, Critic and Methodeutic, “which are names for three branches of Peirce’s
general semiotic” (Brock 1969: 4). The logic of vague is something related to symbols
and is just an element of a triad of terms composed of indeterminacy and generality.
According  to  Peirce  (CP.4.531),  the  creation  of  symbols,  which  are  general  and
indeterminate signs, is governed by a habit – or, more generally a thirdness – that gives
a rule to use and interpret them; in Peirce’s semiotics each sign has its own qualitative
distinctness  and,  through its  triadic  stream of  interpretants  (emotional,  energetical
and logical), makes its object present in its own way. Nevertheless, Peirce’s account of
interpretants3 is quite complex, and I will not discuss it here, since Opera Aperta is still
part of the pre-Peircean period of Eco’s thought. As I mentioned at the beginning of
this section, this journey into Peirce’s logic of vagueness is useful just to highlight its
connection with the qualitative and vague dimension of openness.
8 Peirce begins to research the concept of vagueness when he realizes that no sign is
either  absolutely  determined  and  precise  –  otherwise  knowledge  could  not  be
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questioned and further explored – or absolutely indeterminate – otherwise knowledge
would be meaningless.
A  subject  is  determinate  in  respect  to  any  character  which  inheres  in  it  or  is
(universally and affirmatively) predicated of it, as well as in respect to the negative
of  such character,  these being the very same respect.  In all  other respects it  is
indeterminate. (CP.5.447)
9 Subsequently, vagueness runs through and permeates the entire sign-chain and pushes
signs to specify themselves further in new interpretations. Peirce, therefore, defines
vagueness as something affecting all signs; we can then say that vagueness sheds light
on the processual aspect of semiosis and sets it in motion. More specifically, a sign is
indeterminate  when  it  allows  a  latitude  of  interpretation  or  determination  in  its
definition,  whereas  it  is  determinate  when leaving  no  latitude  of  interpretation  or
determination.  This  latitude  can  be  a  matter  of  intended  breadth  (reference)  or
intended depth (meaning). To summarize, the logic of vagueness is the theoretical tool
by which Peirce defines the conditions of symbols when they may be said to possess the
different  kinds  of  indeterminacy  and  determinacy  in  breadth  and  depth.  As  Brock
specifies (1969: 24), Peirce argues that indefiniteness functions in two ways: the vague
nature of signs involves, on the one hand, the relationship between signs and objects
and, on the other hand, the relationship between signs and interpretants (CP.4.543,
5.448). This partial indeterminacy that characterizes every sign can be declined in two
ways;  hence,  vagueness  and  generality  are  two  opposite  forms  of  indeterminacy
because one excludes the other. Consequently, if a sign is vague, it cannot be general
and vice versa. 
10 Let us now consider Peirce’s 1902 definition of “vague” in the Baldwin Dictionary:
Indeterminate in intention. A proposition is vague when there are possible states of
things  concerning  which  it  is  intrinsically  uncertain  whether,  had  they  been
contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed
by  the  proposition.  By  intrinsically  uncertain  we  mean  not  uncertain  in
consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits
of language were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition as
excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet this must be understood
to have reference to what might be deduced from a perfect knowledge of his state
of mind; for it is precisely because these questions never did, or did not frequently
present themselves that his habit remained indeterminate. (Peirce 1902: 748)
11 A vague sign, then, has a number of possible objects, but the interpretant is limited by
the intended object.  A general  sign has a  number of  possible interpretants,  and its
interpretation  is  not  constrained  by  the  object.4 Since  all  symbols  are  general  and
vague, indeterminacy is double. There is a restriction put on the interpretant by an
indeterminate object – the utterer does not authorize any kind of interpretation – as
well as a latitude of interpretation given to the interpretant by a level of absence of
restriction from the object. To better understand what Peirce has in mind, we have to
look  at  vagueness  as  a  matter  of  firstness,  strictly  bound  to  the  qualitative  and
immediate  potentiality  of  experience.  As  we  know  from  Peirce’s  phaneroscopy,
firstness is a potentiality that needs to be embodied and articulated in the effectual
reality. Vagueness is an element of possibility dealing with the potentiality of qualities,
since to be vague means to be ready for further determinations. Vagueness is then not
related  to  absolute  indeterminacy  but  is  something  capable  of  being  articulated;
possibility  and  potentiality  set  in  motion  the  process  of  articulating  an  experience
which begins from the vague and immediate experience. 
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12 The core of the next section will deal with the qualitative thought of Dewey and Peirce
to specify how the interpretative articulation emerges from pre-discursive and vague
levels of experience.
 
2. Peirce and Dewey on Qualitative Experience 
I am quite sure that he, above all modern philosophers, has opened the road which
permits  a  truly  experiential  philosophy  to  be  developed  which  does  not,  like
traditional empirical philosophies, cut experience off from nature… For this reason,
it  is  important that Peirce’s theory should be understood for what it  is.  (Dewey
1935: 708)
13 These are the conclusive words of Dewey’s Peirce’s Theory of Quality, originally published
in The Journal of Philosophy in 1935. On this occasion Dewey’s aim is not only to show
how Peirce develops the concept of quality, but also to make explicit its role, affirming
its  indispensable  importance  for  an  aesthetic  theory.  As  I  have  already  discussed,
firstness,  according to Peirce’s  mature phaneroscopy,  deals  with indeterminacy and
possibility: it designates the quality of feelings – such as a color, a sound or a taste – in
its perceptive immediacy, without reference to anything else. A quality, which offers a
“possibility of sensation” (CP.1.426), is a simple and unrelated positive character, all-
pervading and wholly possible.
14 Let us now consider how Dewey deepens his  reflection on the notion of  quality by
placing it in an aesthetic context. In order to do this, it is crucial to refer to Dewey’s Art
as Experience (1934), which is one of the seminal contributions to a philosophy of art and
to its correlation with experience. According to Dewey, an aesthetic experience occurs
when an experience, moving from its qualitative and immediate background, develops
and  proceeds,  articulating  its  aesthetic  quality,  towards  its  fulfillment (ibid.:  41).
According  to  Peirce  and  Dewey,  qualities  are  elements  which  unify  the  immediate
experience; therefore, this indeterminate background is required for the uniqueness of
an experience. Our lived experience is immediately qualitative since qualities are the
necessary material to have an experience. Without this unarticulated and indetermined
qualitative background, it is not possible to articulate any kind of experience. 
In  contrast  with  such  experience,  we  have  an  experience  when  the  material
experienced  runs  its  course  to  fulfillment.  Then  and  then  only  is  it  integrated
within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences.
Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and
self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (Ibid.: 35)
15 Thus, an experience comes out of a vague and qualitative immediacy and is something
well-defined, with a precise beginning and ending. Just as in Peirce vagueness refers to
a  potential  and  processual  dimension,  in  the  same  way  the  qualitative  experience
described by Dewey makes it possible to emphasize the dynamic and processual nature
of  the aesthetic  experience,  looking at  the artworks as  bodily  interactions between
artist and audience, or artists and their environment. 
16 The difference between an aesthetic experience and an intellectual one lies in the fact
that the material of art is made up of qualities; the intellectual experience is made up of
signs or symbols that do not have an intrinsic quality of their own but stand for objects
that can be experienced qualitatively in another experience. Briefly, the intellectual
experience  is  qualitatively mediated  by  other  experiences,  whereas  the  aesthetic
Umberto Eco and the Aesthetics of Vagueness
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIII-1 | 2021
5
experience integrates an aesthetic quality towards its fulfilment: this is the quality that
provides the basis for naming a given experience as the unique experience it is.
17 Dewey’s  thesis  is  that  aesthetics  theories  run  counter  to  the  aesthetic  experience,
which involves a perceptual continuity of relations and a sequence of raw sensations
that  can  only  be  found  within  experience  and,  specifically,  a  pre-reflective  (non-
objectified) and qualitative experience.5 Dewey puts the accent on the dynamic quality
of  “openness  to  experience”  rather  than  on  a  fixed  attitude  or  mindset,  thus
emphasizing  how  the  continuity  of  relations  requires  a  non-dualistic  approach.
Therefore, Dewey gives importance to movement, as through movement one acts in
direct response to the world. Movement is then an explicit  strategy not to proceed
from “mind” to experience, but to perceive the relation between human organisms and
world in transactive way.6 I must perceive and “feel” my way forward through active
engagement with the world, which means that my perception changes according to the
objects at hand. In order to explore the quality of openness, I must literally open myself
to the physical sensation of vagueness and indeterminacy. 
18 The next  section  places  the  outcome of  the  first  two in  a  context  that  is  in  some
respects wider and in some respects narrower than the one provided by this discussion.
Hence, we will see in which respects the poetics of the open work is closer to Dewey
and Peirce than to Pareyson.
 
3. Eco Between Pareyson and Dewey
19 Pareyson’s Estetica: Teoria della formatività presents an openly anti-Crocian aesthetics.
Pareyson’s  research,  as  I  will  discuss  in  this  section,  concerns  the  primacy  of  the
person, both in the formative and in the interpretative process, and does not consider
the  performer  and  their  interiority  as  an  obstacle  to  the  work  of  art.  Pareyson’s
aesthetics  develops  around  the  concepts  of  person,  form,  interpretation  and  is
presented as a systematic theory of formativity. 
20 When writing about forms, Pareyson prefers to use the term formativity to avoid the
form-matter dualism in which matter is seen as something passive and static and form
as  an  active  force  printing  its  shape  on  an  immobile  surface.  The  term formativity 
highlights  the  energetic  and  vital  side  not  only  of  forms,  but  also  of  the  matter,
underlining  the  dynamic  process  of  giving  shape  to  something  that  is  already  in
motion.  Matter  and  form  are  a  living  dynamic  organism  even  before  the  act  of
interpretation, as “a form, once it has reached completion and autonomy, can be seen
as perfect only if it is dynamically considered” (Eco 1989: 163). An artwork makes us
aware of new semiosic possibilities and does not train semiosis just at the upper levels,
but also at the lower thresholds of experience itself, from which art emerges as the
transfiguration of matter into sense.
21 According to Pareyson (1974: 59-61), to form means to do and to do means to invent a
new way of doing: when an artist plans to create an artwork, they do not use a pre-
determined rule or technique but proceed by trial and error, experimenting different
possibilities and inventing their proper way to make the artwork. It is necessary to try,
attempting procedures and inventing various possibilities  that  must  be tested;  as  a
result, inventiveness, as the capacity of figuring multiples trails, creates an artwork.
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22 The formative activity has a highly operational character, and its distinctive process is
not  oriented  to  a  mere  realization  of  a  project  given  at  the  beginning;  rather,  it
presents itself as an attempt, open as much to success as to failure, as “art is the ability
to invent the way of doing things” (Pareyson 1954: 59).
23 There is no way to find the form without looking for a way to do it: forms are in the
making. Furthermore, to Pareyson, form and former, as form and matter, are a living
organism too, since the formed matter is both the product and the producer of the
interpretation:  it  is  created  by  the  artist’s  interpretation  and  requires the  user’s
interpretation. 
24 Let us now move on to the concept of interpretation, another cornerstone in Pareyson’s
aesthetics.7 Works of art require the relation with a performer – a reader, a listener, an
observer (Pareyson 1954: 223); the notion of interpretation implies the enjoyment of an
artwork, its translation and, more generally, it implies a certain practice by the user.8
As a  result,  the  interpretative  process  has  a  revelatory  character:  the  interpreter’s
gesture  attempts  to  discover  the  artist’s  intentions  (intentio  auctoris).  There  is  a
phenomenological  residue  in  Pareyson’s  aesthetic  theory  whereby  individual
interpretations highlight different aspects of the same object. 
Interpretation is a form of knowing in which, on one side, receptivity and activity
are inseparable, and, on the other, the known is a form and the knowers is a person.
Without doubts, interpretation is knowledge because to interpret means catching,
grasping, understanding and penetrating. (Pareyson 1954: 189)
25 Works of art are not passive objects that need to be activated by one or multiple acts of
interpretation but are already open and directed towards the act  of  interpretation,
challenging  the  interpreter.  In  fact,  through  the  concepts  of  formativity  and
interpretation,  Pareyson  emphasizes  the  dynamic  elements  both  on  the  level  of
interpretation and  on  the  level  of  constitution  of  the  object.  Eco  borrows  from
Pareyson the procedural and dynamic aspects of the form and the openness of the work
to infinite interpretative perspectives but, contrariwise Eco, following Dewey, argues
that the interpretative process has a productive and creative value.
26 This is the reason why Eco defines the open work as a work in motion: the quality of
openness comes to bear on the direct experience of form-giving, articulating its vague
and  indeterminate  elements.  According  to  Dewey,  furthermore,  the  open  work
promotes a new way of  understanding the relationship between contemplation and
interpretation  of  works  of  art  and,  consequently,  a  new way  of  understanding  the
relationship between the artist and their audience.
Dewey offers us a transactional conception of knowledge that becomes particularly
suggestive when set side by side with his definition of the aesthetic object.  The
work of art,  for him, is  the fruit  of  a process of  organization whereby personal
experiences, facts, values, meanings are incorporated into a particular material and
become one with it. (Eco 1989: 27)
27 According to the poetics of the open work, to make our ideas clear means to entrust the
qualitative  potentiality  of  an  open  work  to  the  infinite  interpretations  of  the
performer.  The  notion  of  vagueness  allows  for  the  understanding  of  openness  by
emphasizing the primacy of interpretative practices rather than the representational
aspect of the artwork. Art is in the experience rather than in the objects: to interpret a
work of art is not to “represent” it, but to open oneself to its demands of presentation.
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Art is formative just as life is formative: it is open, revealing its intrinsic productive
processes to anyone who is attentive.
28 By openness, Eco means a potential and vague conglomerate of possible interpretations
which  can  be  actualized  and  articulated  by  the  performer.  The  performance  is,
therefore, a necessary and constitutive aspect of the reading of a work of art, as it is an
innate and irrepressible aspect of its own formation. It is claimed and desired by the
work because it was already contained in the process that formed it. The fulfilment of
the aesthetic qualities of an open work lies not only in the hands of the author but also
in the performer’s.
29 To clarify a sign – in this case a product of art – means to follow its movement by
practicing it in every possible way; there is no stimulus-response relationship in the
interpretation of a text, but a repetition of form, which is not understood as an eternal
and immutable idea but as power, as formativity, as a transit of interpretations. The
open work starts the semiosic process, the trirelative force that cannot be reduced to a
dyadic relation, or, as Peirce said, the “action, or influence, which is,  or involves, a
cooperation  of  three subjects,  such  as  a  sign,  its  object,  and  its  interpretant,  this
trirelative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (EP.
2.411).  The vitality of an open work lives in that vague and indeterminate gap that
introduces a third element between the reader and the work.
To this extent, ambiguity is not an accessory to the message: it is its fundamental
feature. This is what forces the addressee to approach the message in a different
fashion, not to use it as a mere vehicle. (Eco 1989: 196)
30 Vagueness characterizes the work in its openness and allows the work of art to be open
to different  interpretations.  The author himself  offers  the performer an unfinished
work: they do not know exactly how the work will be. Moreover, vagueness – what
Dewey calls the qualitative level of the experience – can function, according to Eco, as a
sort of introduction to the aesthetic experience, because it stimulates an interpretive
effort, a process that attempts to articulate the qualitative and indeterminate openness
of the experience to its own fulfillment.
31 The  aesthetics  of  openness,  however,  is  a  type  of  aesthetics  of  vagueness  that  is
congruent with a pragmatist account and goes against an essentialist vision, as it will
later become clearer in Eco’s writings on the concept of encyclopedia. The open work is
an  organism  composed  of  interconnected  pluralities  and  without  clear  boundaries.
Movements make the form and form moves, becomes, evolves: it is itself form-making.
The  open  work,  like  the  body  of  a  dancer,  is  formed  through  the  indeterminate
movement  of  the  interpretations  that  stage  it.  We  can  then say  that  the  aesthetic
experience  –  according  to  both  Dewey  and  Eco  –  puts  emphasis  on  the  creative
character of action. This has profound implications for a creative action and a sense of
“self,”  since  it  advances  the  role  of  subjectivity  and  the  ability  to  make  non-
determinate  choices,  which  is  an  essential  component  of  the  making  of  anything
creative,  not only for the artist  but also for the performer and interpreter.  On the
contrary,  according  to  Pareyson,  in  order  to  aesthetically  appreciate  the  sensitive
qualities of an object of art, we must already know that the object is a work of art:
between an object which is a work of art and one that is not, there can be differences
that cannot be considered perceptive differences. 
32 It is not, then, the aesthetic experience which allows us to decide what is or what is not
a work of art, but rather an interpretive act: this is the reason why Eco is closer to the
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qualitative  thought  of  Peirce  and  Dewey  than  to  Pareysonian  hermeneutics.  The
interpretative act is such because it emerges from a vague and qualitative background.
Opera Aperta puts the accent on the fact that to have an experience – or interpreting an
artwork  –  means  to  articulate  a  pervasive,  qualitative  and indeterminate  level  of
experience in its own aesthetic quality. In conclusion, Pareyson’s theory of formativity
is still extensively linked to a phenomenology of the person, with the consequence that
it is the hermeneutic act that distinguishes what is art and what is not.
 
4. More Vagueness, More Information
33 In the previous section I have analyzed how contemporary poetics requires a particular
autonomous commitment of the user, often a reconstruction of the proposed material
in  which  there  is  no  univocal  and  necessary  sequence  of  events,  but  a  field  of
probability  and  a  vagueness  of  possibility  that  stimulate  interpretative  practices.
Therefore,  openness  and vagueness  are  the conditions of  every aesthetic  fruition –
despite  the  fact  that  the  artist  aims  at  univocal  and  clear  communication  –  since
vagueness precedes interpretation and makes it possible. The open work is a concept
fully  consonant  with  a  pragmatist  aesthetics,  which  considers  artworks  and  the
aesthetic  dimensions  of  experience  as  dynamically  directed  towards  a  pluralistic
universe of possible interpretations.
34 This transformative power of the aesthetic message could be defined as an increase and
multiplication  of  the  possible  meanings  of  an  artistic  message.  According  to  Eco,
however,  the  term  may  lead  to misunderstandings,  because  it  is  hard  to  speak  of
“meaning” when analyzing the type of communication provided by an open work. For
this reason, in Opera Aperta, Eco chooses to stress the concept of information in relation
to those of openness and vagueness. As Claudio Paolucci states, according to Eco,
we cannot understand the domain of art if we do not go beyond the domain of art
itself and see what scientists do within the domains of physics and mathematics. We
cannot understand the new avant-garde art unless we go beyond the domain of art
and  try  to  understand  concepts  such  as  “disorder”  and  “entropy”  and  “code,”
which come from the theory of information. (Paolucci 2017: 54)
35 Hence, the poetics of openness implies the search for a source of possible messages
endowed with a certain disorder but tries to reach this condition without losing the
transmission of an ordered message. As stated by Robert E. Innis (2018), vagueness and
openness  are  necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions  to  define  an  open  work.
Furthermore, Eco states that the ambiguity of signs in an artwork cannot be separated
from their  aesthetic  organization:  the two are mutually  supportive and motivating,
since art articulates the qualitative continuum of the experience, considering multiple
aspects of the human life (emotional, intellectual, axiological).
What interests Eco about this theory, in brief, is the principle that the information
(as  opposed to  the  “meaning”)  of  a  message  is  in  inverse  proportion  to  its
probability or predictability. This suggests to him a parallel between the concept of
information and the effect of art, particularly modern art, since the forms of art can
be said to possess a high degree of improbability or unpredictability by virtue of
their contravention of established conventions of expression. Thus, Eco argues, art
in general may be seen as conveying a much higher degree of information, though
not  necessarily  a  higher  degree  of  meaning,  than  more  conventional  kinds  of
communication;  and  the  modern  open  work  may  be  seen  as  conveying  an
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exceptionally high degree of information, because of the radical contraventions of
established conventions that characterize it. (Eco 1989: x-xi)
36 In  the  third  chapter  of  Opera  Aperta  Eco  claims  that  “information  theory  tries  to
calculate  the  quantity  of  information  contained  in  a  particular  message”  and  that
“information is, therefore, an additive quantity, something that is added to what one
already knows as if it were an original acquisition” (1989: 45). The information theory
argues that  a  message produces more information only if  it  says  something totally
different from the information heritage already available to the community. In short, it
is necessary to introduce an element of novelty and disorder to create new forms of
knowledge that will sooner or later become stable habits of the community. As Innis
(2018) perfectly sums up, “disorder in communication is disorder, then, only in relation
to a previous order” and “order introduces disorder in order to introduce new forms of
order.” Now, without dwelling on mathematics and cybernetics, to better understand
this aspect of information theory, let  us focus on two literary cases quoted by Eco,
which make clear how different degrees of vagueness, openness and disorder create
new interpretative perspectives. The first one is from Dante, the second from Joyce, a
writer Eco considered particularly interesting.
O Light Eternal, who alone abidest in Thyself, 
alone knowest Thyself, and known to Thyself
and knowing, lovest and smilest on Thyself! (Eco 1989: 40)
37 Dante offers the reader a limited, low-order openness, describing a univocal object with
univocal signs. He represents a predetermined and necessary cosmos in which each
perspective gives back the same vision: the various parts are indeed only the exact
reproduction of the whole. There is no space for incomprehensibility or for misreading,
because there is nothing vague. As Eco said, “the order of a work of art in this period is
a mirror of imperial and theocratic society” (ibid.: 6). 
From quiqui quinet to michemiche chelet and a jambe-batiste to a brulobrulo! It is
told in sounds in utter that, in signs so adds to, in universal, in polygluttural, in
each  ausiliary neutral  idiom,  sordomutics,  florilingua,  sheltafocal,  flayflutter,  a
con’s cu-bane, a pro’s tutute, strassarab, ereperse and anythongue athall. (Ibid.: 41)
38 Joyce, on the other hand, offers the reader a work to finish, a game of sounds that one
must try to frame in order to build a unified vision of the cosmos. The disorder of signs,
the use of metaphors and the explosion of figures incite the viewer to create their own
network of connections. He introduces “forms of organized disorder into a system to
increase its capacity to convey information” (ibid.: 60). Joyce offers the reader an image
of the ontological situation of the contemporary world: each interpretive response is
configured as a slit that divides the chaosmotic continuum of the text, giving back its
own vision and particular perspective. Joyce creates a message that is multifaceted in
itself and thanks to the form it has taken. Nevertheless, there is no strict difference in
meaning, as both Dante and Joyce try to describe the universe. Therefore, in the second
example, the originality of organization, the unpredictability concerning a probability
system and the disorganization which enters it are the only elements to have caused a
growth in information. The disorder appears to be such solely because it starts from a
pre-existing order.
39 In standard communication the undefined and vague elements must be reduced to a
minimum and the message must be clear and intelligible: the non-aesthetic message is
sluggish and discursive, and it is not articulated as a developing movement towards its
own fulfilment. In the aesthetic message, contrariwise, disorder and fuzzy boundaries
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contribute  to  increase  the  informative  potentiality  and  to  articulate  the  aesthetic
quality, opening it to various interpretations. The difference between Dante’s poetics
and Joyce’s lies in the fact that while the poetics of the former contravenes the order
according to very precise limits, the poetics of the latter inserts innumerable entropic
motifs and disorderly aspects. Consequently, the new order that is born out of it will be
much more unexpected than the original one: the more unpredictable and plurivocal
the structure becomes, the more the information increases.
 
5. Use or Interpretation? Vagueness in Context
40 In the previous sections I examined how openness and vagueness contribute to define
an open work and to articulate the aesthetic message that it  conveys.  Then, I  have
outlined the role of vagueness – on which the poetics of openness is grounded – as a
potential increase in information due to the insertion of entropic motifs and elements
of disorder that reformulate the pre-existing order into new possibilities of order. The
dialectics of the open work – its form a dynamic possibility of multiple meanings –
takes  place  in  the  oscillation  between  standard  communication  and  pure
indeterminacy.  An  open  work  is  shot  through  with  vagueness  and  indeterminacy,
which are not to be understood as “the checkmate of every ordering possibility but as
fertile disorder of which modern culture has shown us the positivity” (Eco 1962: 1).
41 The aim of this section is to distinguish the free use of a text from its interpretation. It
is  first  necessary  to  briefly  consider  the  limits  of  the  semiotic  process  in  order  to
understand  its  practical  effects.  It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  interpretative
freedom  –  offered  to  the  reader  by  the  author  –  has  to  be  supervised  by  formal
coordinates which are open to the free choices of the users. Here “vague” means open
to different possible interpretations, which only a contextual practice can determine.
According to Eco, contextuality, as it is the absence of any kind of essentialism, allows
the author to limit the interpretation using different strategies.
42 If  it  is  true  that  the  concept  of  vagueness  plays  an important  role  in  defining the
concept of an open work, and if it is true that its aesthetic message, in virtue of the
vague form that shapes it, helps to take into consideration the interpretation of the
work, it is necessary, however, to avoid the free use of a text, outlining the limits of the
interpretative process and the role of the reader. That is the reason why Eco, in the
introduction to Lector in Fabula, wrote that it is important to find “a way to consider the
reader but, at the same time, to limit and control it.” In the third section of this paper,
after a brief account of Peirce’s notion of vagueness and Dewey’s concept of quality, I
analyzed how to read a text means to actualize and to articulate a vague tangle of
potentialities. The text needs a reader as a communicative potential, as the life of a text
is outside the text itself, in the different interpretative acts that actualize it. In Lector in
Fabula, Eco adds that this step is necessary because open texts, more than the closed
ones, are incomplete for two reasons: the first reason is that each message requires a
grammatical competence on the part of the writer; the second one is that the aim of a
text is to leave the interpretative initiative to the reader. A text, more decisively than
any other message,  requires  active and conscious cooperative movements  from the
reader.  The  work  of  interpretation,  however,  imposes  the  choice  of  limits,  the
delimitation of interpretative directions and the design of universes of discourse. On
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this matter, Eco introduces a fundamental notion for the reader to understand what he
(Eco) means when he writes about “limiting the universe of discourse.”
43 The  concept  of  a  model  reader  is  nothing  more  than  a  strategy  that  the  author
implements to limit the possible interpretations of a text. To postulate a model reader
is to outline the conditions of interpretability of a text. To explain how this strategy
work, I must refer to its chiasmic structure. The notion of model reader brings with it
three other elements necessary to articulate this strategy: the empirical reader, the
empirical author and the model author. As a consequence of this chiasmic structure, on
the one hand the empirical author presupposes a model reader, while, on the other
hand, the empirical reader presupposes a model author (Eco 1978: 62). Eco explains that
“presupposing” does not only mean hypothesizing but also producing a model reader,
moving the text in such a way as to constitute them. When an empirical author decides
to  write  a  text,  they must  take  into  consideration the  addressees  of  the  text,  thus
outlining a sort of interpretative map. This map allows some paths and forbids others.
In turn, the empirical reader, reading the text,  will  be led to recognize, behind the
writing of the text, a model author, of whom they have no direct knowledge and whose
generative process they must understand. If an author decides to provide the reader
with a rather complex and cross-referenced interpretative map, such a map will  be
more open to different interpretations because the high degree of vagueness fragments
the univocal meaning of a text. If,  on the contrary, the map with which the author
provides their reader has a unique direction, then the reader will have a lower chance
of misinterpreting a text. For this reason, the reader of a “closed” text will be more
inclined to force it into meaning what they want.
44 What limits the interpretation of a text is therefore determined by the strategy that the
author chooses to implement, restricting, to a greater or lesser extent, the universe of
discourse  of  a  text.  Following  the  different  possibilities  of  a  text,  within  a  given
discourse universe, means interpreting a text;  enlarging the discourse universe, not
taking into account the author’s intentions, means using a text. Open and vague texts
require model readers of a different nature, whereas closed and precise texts reduce
the spectrum of possible readers. If a text is constructed in such a way as to have a
vaguer  universe  of  discourse,  then  the  reader  will  not  feel  the  need  to  widen  its
boundaries.
I tried to show that the notion of unlimited semiosis does not lead to the conclusion
that  interpretation  has  no  criteria.  To  say  that  interpretation  is  potentially
unlimited does not mean that interpretation has no object and that it “riverruns”
merely for its own sake. To say that a text has potentially no end does not mean
that every act of interpretation can have a happy end. (Eco 1992: 23-4)
45 Thus, Eco claims that there is nothing more open than a closed text but, in this case,
openness does not mean that the text is open to various interpretations, but only that it
allows for a free use by the reader. In this regard, Eco brings a clear example of a free
use of a text: Les Mystères de Paris by Sue. Even if this text has a different purpose, it was
interpreted  in  a  proletarian  way.9 The  extreme  openness  of  a  closed  text  often
translates into violence, into a use that is partial and unwanted by the author: it is an
act of violence rather than an act of cooperation between author and reader. A text
that postulates only one type of reader, will be more likely to become another book, as
happened to Les Mystères de Paris. 
46 Universes of discourse and the strategy of the model reader create the possibility of
interpreting  texts,  the  communicative  conditions  to  which  they  are  subject,  the
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assurance of a communicative relationship that does not degenerate into chaos, the
tension within a mass of information made intentionally available to the user and a
guaranteed minimum of comprehension – the encounter between the will of the author
and the reader’s response.
Any other decision to use a text freely corresponds to the decision to enlarge the
universe of discourse. The dynamic of unlimited semiosis does not prohibit it, but
rather encourages it. But you need to know whether you want to practice semiosis
or interpret a text. (Eco 1978: 66; my translation)
47 So, going back to the first lines of this paper, it can be noted then that Peirce’s notion of
vagueness  –  as  Eco’s  concept  of  openness  –  works  twice  as  a  surplus:  a  surplus  of
signification, diffused at the level of the unlimited cross-reference of semiosis, as we
saw in the previous section; and a surplus of action, never confined to a single univocal
rule, but which always foresees its variation and determination. The poetics of the open
work sheds light on the fact that meanings and situations can be vague and undefined,
and they can be left partially indeterminate as long as such indeterminacy allows us to
continue our inquiry. As a result, Eco notices that all interpretation takes place in a
context of  communication:  it  is  finally  not  important  that  some  predicates  should
suffer  from logico-semantical  indeterminacy,  providing that  the context  is  there to
help us specify our knowledge, which involves our acritical beliefs and the habits upon
which we build our relation with the world.
48 In other words, the essence of the open work does not lie in the absence of meaning but
rather  in  its  multiplicity,  since  artworks  represent  an  attempt  at  creating  new
meanings and alternative possibilities, which, if accepted by society as a whole, enrich
our common daily practices. In conclusion, according to Eco, art has a transformative,
pragmatic and instrumental power, since to create and to interpret artworks means to
change the ways in which practices and habits transform the world,  enhancing the
development of the human organism with its environment.
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NOTES
1. “At the same time, I was interested in the study of aesthetics and, naturally, all beginners had
to read the idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce. Even at that time I was beginning to think that
Croce  had  not  understood  much  about  art,  and  in  that  sense,  I  was  rebelling  against
contemporary Italian culture, which still lay within the idealist camp. This was the reason why,
in order to elude the influence of German idealist philosophers, who were mandatory reading for
all Italian philosophy students, I (like many others of my generation) went in for French and
Anglo-American  philosophy.  In  my  university  years  reading  Dewey’s  Art  as  Experience  was  a
liberation for me,” Eco (2017: 30-1).
2. For a close examination of these issues, see Nadin 1980, Tiercelin 1992 and Fabbrichesi 2001.
3. According to Peirce, there are different kind of interpretants. The first one is immediate and
“includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending.” On the second one,
called energetic, Pierce says that “if it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind
of effort.” The third interpretant is logical or final and deals with a habit of action (EP.2.409).
4. In the final section, we will see how this “restriction of interpretation” could be interpreted in
Eco’s terms and how this restriction plays a fundamental role in distinguishing between using
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(and so overinterpreting) and interpreting an open work. In this sense, an open work does not
authorize any kind of interpretation because vagueness works as a context dependent notion.
5. “Dewey is perfectly aware of the fact that the ‘dim’ and the ‘vague’ of a primary experience –
which always precede the categorical rigidity imposed on us by reflection – are aspects of its
global nature,” Eco (1989: 26).
6. “In spite of the elliptical character of Keats’ statements two points emerge. One of them is his
conviction that ‘reasonings’ have an origin like that of the movements of a wild creature toward
its goal, and they may become spontaneous, ‘instinctive,’ and when they become instinctive are
sensuous and immediate, poetic. The other side of this conviction is his belief that no ‘reasoning’
as reasoning, that is,  as excluding imagination and sense, can reach truth. Even ‘the greatest
philosopher’  exercises  an  animal-like  preference  to  guide  his  thinking  to  its  conclusions,”
(Dewey 1934: 33).
7. “Referring to Pareyson’s aesthetics, Eco notes how a certain openness is typical of all art, since
the form always challenges the interpreter, whose point of view constitutes a concrete personal
perspective on the work itself. On the other hand, the poetics that make this instance its own
identifies openness as the fundamental aspect of contemporary art,” (Oliva 2018: 1085).
8. In Eco’s reformulation, the general conditions of the interpretative process are taken up in the
open  work  as  a  precise  poetic  program,  reshaping  the  relationship  between  work  and
performance and inviting the interpreter and the user to a participatory and active attitude. 
9. “This was the case of Sue’s Les Mystères de Paris, which, written initially in a dandyish mood to
please cultivated readers, aroused as a result a passionate process of identification on the part of
an  illiterate  audience:  when,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  written  to  educate  such  a  ‘dangerous’
audience to a moderate vision of social harmony, it produced as a side effect a revolutionary
uprising,” (Eco 1979: 8).
ABSTRACTS
In this essay I will discuss the issue of vagueness when defining the concept of open work within
the  philosophy  of  Umberto  Eco  (1932-2016),  particularly  considering  its  relevance  for  the
development of  his  original  semiotic  view.  The analysis  of  vagueness  allows us  to stress  the
importance of Eco’s concept of open work not only in Opera Aperta (1962) but in different phases
of his thought. This paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 briefly outlines the Peircean
notion of vagueness, trying to understand it as a pivotal concept to define the structure and
dynamical form of the open work. Section 2 dwells on the concept of quality in both John Dewey
and Charles Sanders Peirce: here the possibility of articulating an interpretation is considered
embodied  in  the  vague  immediacy  of  the  qualitative  experience.  Section 3  analyses  to  what
extent an artwork can be considered open and in motion, according to the Pareysonian concepts
of form and interpretation. Section 4 stresses the hypothesis that vagueness produces not only
the condition of possibility  of  an open work and of  its  multiple  interpretations,  but  also  an
increase of information due to its aesthetic quality. Section 5 calls into question the distinction
between use and interpretation and specifies that interpreting an open work does not mean
using it  for your own purposes but interpreting a developmental movement towards its own
fulfilment;  a  text  is  nothing  other  than  the  rule  that  constitutes  the  universe  of  its
interpretations.
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